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PCAOB and the Persistence of the
Removal Puzzle
PatriciaL. Bellia*
ABSTRACT
In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board ("PCAOB"), the Supreme Court invalidateda statutory provisionprotecting the tenure of members of the PCAOB, a board created to oversee the
auditing of public companies subject to the securities laws. The case carried
the potentialfor a major shift in the Court's approach to separationof powers
disputes. Although the Court delivered no such result, the PCAOB case provides a fascinatingwindow on the removal puzzle. The case reflects an entanglement of multiple textually derived and nontextual separation of powers
principles. One of the centralprincipleson which the Court appearedto rely
in invalidating the PCAOB's tenure protection provision-thatthe "executive
Power" Article II vests in the President encompasses a power of removalcannot account for the Court's ultimate holding. Disentangling the threads of
the PCAOB Court's reasoning, and tracing those threads back to prior removal disputes, exposes both how the PCAOB Court sought to refocus assessment of removal questions on the specific obligationsthat faithful execution of
the laws entails and the ways in which the PCAOB Court's own assessment
fell short.
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INTRODUCTION

In Free EnterpriseFund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board ("PCAOB"),1 the Supreme Court invalidated a key portion of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.2 In creating the multimember Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB"), Congress had
provided that a member of the PCAOB could be removed only by the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), and only upon an onthe-record finding of a violation of law, willful abuse of authority, or
failure to enforce compliance with accounting standards. 3 Members of
the SEC themselves enjoy protection against removal by the President
except for cause. 4 The Court concluded that the resulting "dual forcause limitations" on removal-with PCAOB members only removable for cause by an entity whose members the President could only
remove for cause-"contravene the Constitution's separation of
powers. "5

Judge Brett Kavanaugh, whose dissent in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit likely propelled the case to the Supreme
I Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
2

Id. at 3161; Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7266 (2006).

3 15 U.S.C. § 7217(d)(3).
4 The Court so assumed, based on the agreement of the parties, despite statutory silence
on this point. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3148-49. For criticism of that assumption, see id. at
3182-84 (Breyer, J., disseniing); see also Peter L. Strauss, On the Difficulties of GeneralizationPCAOB in the Footsteps of Myers, Humphrey's Executor, Morrison, and Freytag, 32 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2255, 2276-77 (2011) (characterizing the majority's assumption as "astonishing, particularly coming from conservative Justices who repeatedly assert that it is for Congress, not the
courts, to make law"). But see Gary Lawson, Stipulating the Law, 109 MIcH. L. REV. 1191, 1195
(2011) (arguing that although critics of the Court's assumption are "probably right from the
standpoint of established practice," they are "wrong from the standpoint of sound principles of
adjudication").
5 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3151.
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Court, 6

characterized PCAOB as "the most important separation-ofpowers case regarding the President's appointment and removal powers to reach the courts ' 7 since Morrison v. Olson,8 the 1988 decision
sustaining the creation of the Office of the Independent Counsel. 9
That was perhaps not much of a distinction, as appointment and removal disputes arrive in court relatively infrequently.10 Yet both defenders and detractors of the PCAOB's structure recognized the
potential for a major shift in the Court's approach in separation of
powers cases, with those in the former camp urging that the Court not
use a "relatively minor case.., to address very large issues concerning
the structure of the executive branch of the federal government,"' 1
and those in the latter camp treating the case as an opportunity to
reconsider and reject Morrison as "a problematic and flawed
precedent.'

12

The Court satisfied neither camp. Substantively, the Court
granted the PCAOB's challengers a hollow victory. Although the
Court invalidated the PCAOB's tenure-protection provision, it found
that the provision could be severed from the remainder of the
6 Cf Peter L. Strauss, Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board, 62 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 51, 52 (2009) (calling Judge Kavanaugh's opinion "an open
invitation to the originalists on the [Supreme] Court").
7 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 685 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 3138.
8 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).

9 See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 601, 92 Stat. 1824, 1867
(creating the "Special Prosecutor"); Ethics in Government Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-409, § 2, 96 Stat. 2039, 2039 (1983) (changing the "Special Prosecutor" title to "Independent Counsel"); Morrison, 487 U.S. at 696-97 (upholding the Independent Counsel provisions).
10 See Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 685 (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting) (noting that appointment and removal cases "have arisen sporadically throughout American history"). Appointments Clause controversies reaching the Supreme Court after Morrison, for example, include
Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991); Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163 (1994); Ryder
v. United States, 515 U.S. 177 (1995); and Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997). The last
three of these cases all related to the same basic statutory scheme. See Weiss, 510 U.S. at 165-68
(sustaining the assignment of commissioned military officers, without reappointment under the
Appointments Clause, to serve as military judges); Ryder, 515 U.S. at 188 (vacating a decision by
a panel of military judges that included two civilians appointed by the General Counsel of the
Department of Transportation); Edmond, 520 U.S. at 666 (upholding decisions by panels of military judges that included civilians reappointed by the Secretary of Transportation).
11 Harold H. Bruff, On Hunting Elephants in Mouseholes, 62 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC
127, 127 (2009); see also Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Powers, Independent Agencies, and
FinancialRegulation: The Case of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 485, 489 (2009)
(characterizing the PCAOB's critics as launching "thinly disguised attacks on the constitutionality of independent administrative agencies per se").
12 Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, Remove Morrison v. Olson, 62 VAND. L.
REV. EN BANC 103, 104 (2009).
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act, making the PCAOB's members removable at
will by the SEC. 13 This ruling gave no practical relief to petitioner

Beckstead and Watts, LLP, the Nevada accounting firm (and Free Enterprise Fund member) as to which the PCAOB had filed a critical
report. 14 The Court also rejected an Appointments Clause challenge
to the PCAOB's structure-a challenge that, if successful, likely
would have called the validity of the PCAOB's prior actions into ques-

tion. 15 More broadly, the Court declined to reconsider its past cases,
no doubt a frustration for advocates of overruling Morrison and a solace to those who had argued that the Court should not "put the con-

6
stitutionality of a wide range of government institutions in shadow."'
As the dissent and many commentators recognized, however, the
practical sweep of the Court's holding is unclear, both for other officers protected by dual for-cause removal provisions 17 and for independent agencies more generally. 18

Similarly, the PCAOB's critics and defenders alike would have

found the Court's separation of powers methodology unsatisfying.
The Court appeared to fracture along predictable formal and functional lines. The majority focused on whether the dual for-cause removal provision satisfied the Constitution's assignment of the
13 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S.Ct. 3138, 3161 (2010).
14 Id. at 3149.
15 Id. at 3163-64; cf.Stryker Spine v. Biedermann Motech GmbH, 684 F. Supp. 2d 68, 72
(D.D.C. 2010) (rejecting the claim that a decision by a panel of patent judges, one of whom was
allegedly appointed unconstitutionally, is null and void, where the panel considered claims on
rehearing after the concededly constitutional reappointment of the judge).
16 Strauss, supra note 6, at 51-52.
17 See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3177-82 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Jerome Nelson,
Administrative Law Judges' Removal "Only for Cause": Is That Administrative ProcedureAct
Protection Now Unconstitutional?,63 ADMIN. L. REV. 401, 410, 413-16 (2011) (noting that after
PCAOB, administrative law judges ("ALJ") could be constitutionally "at risk on one day and
not the next" depending on the nature of the agency, the nature of the AL's decision, and
"third-party choices about appealing or reviewing [decisions]"); cf Kevin M. Stack, Agency Independence After PCAOB, 32 CARDozo L. REV. 2391, 2392 (2011) (suggesting that PCAOB's
implications for dual for-cause removal structures are "clear"-meaning that PCAOB would
invalidate such structures).
18 See Richard H. Pildes, Free Enterprise Fund, Boundary-Enforcing Decisions, and the
Unitary Executive Branch Theory of Government Administration, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
PoL'Y 1, 7-8 (2010) (noting the potential for future courts to expand the principles of the decision "beyond the peculiar context of dual for-cause removal structures"); Neomi Rao, A Modest
Proposal:Abolishing Agency Independence in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 79 FOrHAM L.
REv.2541, 2541 (2011) (arguing that the logic of PCAOB "calls into question the constitutionality of agency independence"); Stack, supra note 17, at 2411-13 (arguing that after PCAOB, the
fact that an agency performs some adjudicative functions may not be enough to sustain for-cause
removal provisions).
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legislative, executive, and judicial powers 19 and rejected the argument
that it should sustain the dual for-cause removal structure as the sort
of "practical accommodation between the Legislature and the Executive that should be permitted in a workable government. 20 The dissent, by contrast, emphasized that the proper analysis required
"examining how a particular provision, taken in context, is likely to
function" 21-in this case, whether the dual for-cause removal provision permits Congress to "aggrandize" its own power. 22 The invalidation of the PCAOB's dual for-cause protection thus might be taken as
another formalist peak in the Court's pendulum swing between separation of powers methodologies. The Court stopped far short, however, of accepting what many commentators saw as the clear
implications of a textual, formal approach to removal: that the President must have an unlimited power to direct or remove any and all
23
officials who exercise significant executive authority.
One cannot fault the Court for deciding only the case before it.
A closer look at PCAOB, however, shows that the case is not simply
an incremental application of formalist methodology. Rather, the
case reflects an entanglement of multiple textually derived and
nontextual separation of powers principles. One of the central principles on which the Court appears to rely to invalidate the dual forcause removal provision-that Article II's vesting of the executive
power in the President confers removal authority on the Presidentcannot account for the Court's ultimate holding. Whether or not the
PCAOB Court's analysis is correct as a matter of first principles, it is
worth asking whether the case signals any shifting methodological
ground for removal disputes. We can answer that question only by
disentangling the threads of the PCAOB Court's reasoning, and trac19 See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3146 (noting that "[o]ur Constitution divided the
'powers of the new Federal Government into three defined categories, Legislative, Executive,
and Judicial"' (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983))).
20 Id. at 3155 (quoting Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 276 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
21 Id. at 3167 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
22

See id. (noting that "Congress has not granted itself any role in removing the members

of the [PCAOB]"); see also Pildes, supra note 11, at 490 (claiming that whether the PCAOB's
structure is constitutional depends solely upon whether there is "impermissible congressional
participation itself' in appointment, removal, or execution and implementation of federal law).
23 See, e.g., Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 12, at 107 ("The constitutional text is crystal clear:
[officials who "exercise executive power" such as SEC Commissioners or members of the
PCAOB] must be subject to presidential powers of direction and control, or they must be removable by the President at will.").
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ing those threads back to prior removal disputes. The PCAOB case
thus offers a fascinating window on the removal puzzle.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I outlines three key theories on the source of removal authority. This Part presumes the need
to anchor the removal power in the Constitution and thus links each
of the positions to the constitutional text. It does so, however, not to
take sides in the debate over the proper methodology for resolving
separation of powers controversies, but rather to facilitate a later comparison with the Supreme Court's analysis of removal questions. Part
II carries two of the three theories forward to assess how the theories
fare in major removal disputes before PCAOB. Part III then turns to
PCAOB. The PCAOB Court commits to an analysis of the PCAOB's
structure that is both textual and formal, but it ultimately delivers
something quite different. First, although the Court repeatedly invokes Article II's vesting of the executive power in the President, the
Court offers a limited vision of the executive power and ultimately
produces a holding-validating the PCAOB's structure after excising
the second layer of tenure protection-that is in tension with a broad
understanding of the executive power in this context. Second, the
Court invokes the duty the Constitution imposes on the President to
"take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed. '24 Yet the Court
neither distinguishes any powers implied by the Take Care duty from
the powers that the executive power encompasses nor uses the Take
Care Clause to inform its understanding of the executive power. Finally, the Court invokes a set of structural considerations untethered
to specific constitutional provisions. 25 The structural principles the
Court identifies, however, do not fully explain the Court's holding.
PCAOB, in short, reflects the Court's continuing ambivalence
about the source of constraints on Congress's power to limit the President's removal authority. As for whether the PCAOB case signals
any shifting methodological ground for analyzing removal disputes,
disentangling PCAOB's threads reveals that the obligation of faithful
execution provides the most plausible constitutional basis for the
Court's holding. Although PCAOB itself reflects no significant move
toward an unlimited presidential removal power to direct or remove
executive officials, the Court's reasoning, taken to its logical conclusion, demands more sustained attention to the relationship between
24 U.S. CONsT.

art. II, § 3.

25 See John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L.

REV. 1939, 1950 (2011) (describing a "penumbral" approach to separation of powers that is a
feature of functional and formal methodologies alike).
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the President's obligation of faithful execution and the power of
removal.
I.

LOCATING REMOVAL AUTHORITY (AND ITS LIMITS) IN
CONSTITUTIONAL SILENCE

The only constitutional provisions that speak directly to removal
of federal officers are those concerning impeachment. Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution specifies that "all Civil Officers of the
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for and
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. ' 26 Article I vests the "sole Power of Impeachment" in the
28
House 27 and the "sole Power to try all Impeachments" in the Senate.
In 1789, as they considered how to structure key executive departments under the new Constitution, members of the First Congress
explored at length questions about the source and scope of the power
to remove executive officers other than through Congress's impeachment powers.2 9 After debates spanning more than a month, Congress
by statute established three executive departments: the Department of
Foreign Affairs, 30 the Department of War, 31 and the Treasury Department. 32 Each statute provided for the appointment within the department of a Secretary as the "principal officer" or "head of the
department. ' 33 That officer would be nominated by the President by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate. 34 By providing for an
inferior officer to have custody of departmental papers in the event
that the President removed the head of the department, each statute
also indirectly acknowledged a presidential authority to remove the
Secretary. 35
The debates leading up to the passage of the three statutes have
been explored in great detail elsewhere. 36 The challenge these stat26 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
27 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.

28 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
29 For a detailed overview of these debates, see Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the
Decision of 1789, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1021, 1029-34 (2006).

30 Act of July 27, 1789, ch. 4, 1 Stat. 28.
31 Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 49.
32 Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 65.
33 § 1, 1 Stat. at 29 (creating the Secretary for the Department of Foreign Affairs); § 1, 1
Stat. at 50 (creating the Secretary for the Department of War); § 1, 1 Stat. at 65 (creating the
Secretary of the Treasury).
34 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
35 See § 2, 1 Stat. at 29; § 2, 1 Stat. at 50; § 7, 1 Stat. at 67.
36 See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PE-
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utes present is that their indirect acknowledgment of presidential removal authority is consistent with multiple theories about the source
of that removal authority: that the authority to appoint an officer carries with it the authority to remove the officer; 37 that the Constitution
grants Congress the authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause
to delegate the removal power as Congress sees fit;38 or that Article II
of the Constitution, by vesting the executive power in the President
and imposing a duty of faithful execution of the laws, confers removal
authority directly on the President. 39 These different potential sources
of removal authority, moreover, may generate a removal power of different scope or tolerate different congressional limitations. Accordingly, the 1789 statutes' implied acknowledgment of an unfettered
presidential removal authority, without more, says nothing about
whether the Constitution demands such an authority, or whether it
instead permits substantial legislative regulation of removal authority.
As a result, judges and scholars alike have long debated whether the
actions of the First Congress signal a "Decision of 1789" on the scope
of a presidential authority to remove executive officials, what that decision entails, and whether any such decision is relevant at all to our
modern understanding of separation of powers. 40
This Article will not enter that debate. Regardless of how one
evaluates the First Congress's actions in 1789, the controversy surrounding the creation of the great executive departments provides a
useful lens for viewing the possible constitutional sources of the removal authority. Rather than offering a descriptive account of the
congressional debates of 1789, this Article uses key arguments from
those debates to frame, and to test the limits of, three basic theories of
how the Constitution allocates removal authority. 41 We can set aside
1789-1801, at 40-43 (1997); Edward S. Corwin, Tenure of Office and the Removal Power
Under the Constitution, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 353, 360-63 (1927); Prakash, supra note 29, at
1023-26.
37 See infra Part I.A.
38 See infra Part I.B.
RIOD

See infra Part I.C.
See, e.g., Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 630-31 (1935) (derisively referring to "the so-called 'decision of 1789"'); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 142-63 (1926)
(extensively discussing judicial use of and congressional acquiescence in the "Decision of 1789");
id. at 250 (Brandeis, J.,dissenting) (arguing that "Congress has, from the foundation of our
Government, exercised continuously some measure of control [over removal] by legislation");
see also Corwin, supra note 36, at 361; Currie, supra note 36, at 41; Prakash, supra note 29, at
1023-26.
41 For a thorough descriptive account of the debates and theories, see Prakash, supra note
39

40

29, at 1028-41.
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the theory that the Constitution limits removal to cases of impeachment and conviction. 42 The Article considers in turn: (1) the theory
that removal authority flows from the appointment power, thus creating at a minimum a default removal power in the appointing authority; (2) the theory that Congress can grant removal authority, either as
an incident to its power to except appointment of inferior officers
from presidential appointment and Senate advice and consent, or
under its authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to carry
government powers into execution; and (3) the theory that the Vesting
Clause or the Take Care Clause of Article II confers removal authority on the President. As will become clear, however, the critical question is not merely which of the underlying constitutional provisionsthe Appointments Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, or the
Vesting or Take Care Clauses of Article II-gives rise to the authority
to remove executive officers, but how the remaining constitutional
provisions might constrain that authority.
A.

Removal Authority as Incidental to Appointment Authority

Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint," officers of the United States, but that "Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as
they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in
the Heads of Departments. '43 The Appointments Clause thus establishes presidential appointment after senatorial advice and consent as
the required procedure for appointment of principal officers and as
the default procedure for appointment of inferior officers. The question is whether under either approach the appointment power carries
with it an inherent power of removal.
In the House debates over establishing the key executive departments,44 numerous representatives asserted or acknowledged that the
42 The notion that the Impeachment Clauses might set the boundaries of authority to remove executive officials sits uneasily both with the constitutional text, which specifically guarantees tenure "during good Behaviour" for judges but not other officers, U.S. CorqsT. art. III, § 1,
and with a long tradition of patronage. The House debates on the bills to establish the key
executive departments indicate minimal support for the position that the Constitution limits removal to cases of impeachment. See Corwin, supra note 36, at 361-62 n.22 (noting that one of
the few proponents of the impeachment theory came to change his position); Prakash, supra
note 29, at 1035-36 (explaining that the impeachment theory had the support of "no more than
two or three Representatives" and "would have led to the splintering and distribution of execu-

tive power").
43 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
2.
44 See supra text accompanying notes 30-36.
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power of appointment carries with it the power of removal. For some,
however, this claim meant that the Senate should have a say in the
removal of officers for whom the Constitution required its advice and
consent to the appointment 45-i.e., in the case of all principal officers
and in the case of inferior officers whose appointment Congress did
not except from this process. As adopted, the statutes creating the
key executive departments implicitly rejected any role for the Senate,
for they acknowledged only the possibility of presidential removal of
each Secretary.46 Indeed, in connection with the initial House resolution calling for creation of the three executive departments, the House
had rejected a motion that would have required the advice and consent of the Senate for removals.47
Neither Congress's statutory acknowledgment of a presidential
removal authority nor the House's earlier rejection of a motion providing for senatorial advice and consent on removal, however, clarifies
whether the removal power flows from the appointment power or
from some other source. The statutes involved principal officers
whose appointment could not be vested with anyone but the President, so the statutes' acknowledgment of a presidential removal authority was consistent with the idea that the removal power follows
the appointment power. As for the House's rejection of senatorial advice and consent to removal, the debates indicate that some representatives opposed the Senate's participation in removal not because they
rejected the removal-follows-appointment theory, but because they
believed that the Senate's consent did not actually constitute exercise
of the appointment authority, 48 or that the Senate's involvement in
See, e.g.,

June 17, 1789, reprinted in DEBATES IN THE
1789, 11 DOCUMENTARY HisTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 4 MARCH
1789-3 MARCH 1791, at 904, 917 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter DEBATES JUNE-SEPTEMBER 1789] (statement of Rep. Sherman) (calling the argument that the President has the sole power to remove principal officers "ill founded, because [the advice and
consent] provision was intended for some useful purpose, and by that construction would answer
none at all"); CONGRESSIONAL REGISTER, May 19, 1789, reprintedin DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, FIRST SESSION: APRIL-MAY 1789, 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 4 MARCH 1789-3 MARCH
1791, at 722, 729 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter DEBATES APRIL-MAY
1789] (statement of Rep. Bland) (arguing that "the power which appointed should remove" and
noting that he would not object to a declaration that "the president shall remove from office, by
and with the advice and consent of the senate").
46 See supra text accompanying note 35.
47 See Prakash, supra note 29, at 1030 (noting that Rep. Bland proposed a short-lived
amendment that would have required senatorial advice and consent to removal).
48 See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL
REGISTER, June
18, 1789, reprinted in DEBATES
45

CONGRESSIONAL REGISTER,

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FIRST SESSION: JUNE-SEPTEMBER
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trying impeachments foreclosed any other removal role.49 In other
words, even if we take the statutes creating the key executive departments as a congressional acknowledgment of presidential authority to
remove the principal officers heading those departments, the statutes
do not definitively identify the constitutional source of that presidential authority.
Moreover, even if the power to appoint carries the power to remove, questions about the scope of and limitations on the removal
power remain. In the case of an inferior officer whose appointment
Congress has vested with the head of a department, 50 the removal-

fo!!ows-appointmet theory might foreclose direct presidential removal authority, because the President is not the appointing authority.
In addition, whether the President or the department head is the ap-

pointing authority, the removal-follows-appointment theory does not
foreclose the possibility that, through its power to "make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" 51 the
powers conferred by the Constitution, Congress retains some authority to restrict removal.
In sum, the 1789 statutes are consistent with the removal-followsappointment theory, but that theory does not necessarily imply that
JUNE-SEPTEMBER 1789, supra note 45, at 966 (statement of Rep. Boudinot) ("[D]oes it appear

from this distribution of power [between the Senate and President] that the senate appoints?
Does an officer exercise powers by authority of the senate? No; I believe the president is the
person from whom he derives his authority .... [S]urely the removal follows as coincident.");
DAILY ADVERTISER, June 19, 1789, reprinted in DEBATES JUNE-SEPTEMBER 1789, supra note 45,
at 886-87 (statement of Rep. Laurence) (arguing that the Constitution grants the President the
appointment power and that the Senate's role is merely advisory); see also Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52, 119 (1926) ("Does [the Senate's advice and consent role] make the Senate
part of the removing power? And this, after the whole discussion in the House is read attentively, is the real point which was considered and decided in the negative by the vote already
given."); Prakash, supra note 29, at 1037 ("One of the most powerful objections [to allowing the
Senate a role in removal] was that a Senate check on presidential removals would render the
legislature a two-headed monster" and would limit presidential power by allowing "[o]fficers [to]
curry senatorial favor and thereby secure the permanence of their positions.").
49 See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL REGISTER, June 16, 1789, reprinted in DEBATES
JUNE-SEPTEMBER 1789, supra note 45, at 875 (statement of Rep. Boudinot) (arguing that in light
of the Senate's role in trying impeachments, "it was never the intention of the constitution to
vest the power of removal in the president and senate"); CONGRESSIONAL REGISTER, May 19,
1789, reprinted in DEBATES APRIL-MAY 1789, supra note 45, at 739 (statement of Rep. Vining)
(noting that the Senate's judgment on removal questions could prevent the Senate from acting as
"the equal and unbiassed judicature which the constitution contemplates them to be" in deciding
impeachments).
50 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
2 ("[Tlhe Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of
such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in
the Heads of Departments.").
51 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.18.

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:1371

the appointing authority-whether the President or a department
head-possesses unfettered removal authority. Such a conclusion requires a separate inquiry into the scope of Congress's power to limit
removal authority, an inquiry undertaken in Section D.
B.

CongressionalDelegation of Removal Authority

The Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the authority
to carry into execution the governmental powers the Constitution creates.52 Under that authority, Congress can establish executive offices. 53 One could argue that the congressional authority to establish
an office includes the authority to delegate the power to remove the
officer. Analogously, the Appointments Clause recognizes Congress's
power to alter the default mode of appointment for inferior officers.
One could argue that the authority to vary the default mode of appointment carries with it the authority to confer removal power, at
least in those cases in which Congress does vary the mode of appointment. For present purposes, then, we must ask whether removal authority is a product of congressional delegation either under the
Necessary and Proper Clause or the power to vary the mode of appointment of inferior officers.
During the 1789 debates over creation of the executive departments, a number of representatives took the position that Congress
should confer removal authority on the President.54 To the extent that
the statutes as approved by Congress recognize a presidential removal
power 5 5 they are consistent with a view that the presidential power is
the product of congressional delegation. The theory presents some
difficulties, however. First, Congress's authority to vary the mode of
appointment of inferior officers cannot be the sole source of the authority to confer removal power, for if it were, Congress could not
confer removal authority in the case of principal officers. The Necessary and Proper Clause would have to come into play. Second, what
would occur if Congress failed to delegate removal authority at all? If
Id.
U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, see also Corwin, supra note 36, at 384-85 ("Congress's
power to create offices is a mere matter of inference from the 'necessary and proper' clause, an
inference, albeit, which is directly and significantly confirmed by the express language of the
Constitution.").
54 See Prakash, supra note 29, at 1038 ("The congressional-delegation theory's champions ... [argued that] Congress could remedy [the lack of express constitutional removal power]
simply by delegating removal authority ....
Most supporters of this theory favored the delegation of removal to the President.").
55 See supra text accompanying note 35.
52

53
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there were no default removal power, then Congress's failure to delegate the power to remove would leave impeachment as the sole means
of removal. In light of the widespread consensus that impeachment is
not the exclusive avenue of removal,5 6 the Constitution must lodge the
removal authority somewhere by default. Third and most important,
the congressional delegation theory appears to admit of no limitations. Those who favored the congressional delegation approach
could not explain why, if Congress has the power to delegate removal
authority, Congress could not delegate that authority to someone
outside of the executive branch. Accounts of James Madison's comments during the debate over creation of the Department of Foreign
Affairs captured this difficulty:
[I]f the legislature has a power, such as contended for, they
may... exclude the president altogether from exercising any
authority in the removal of officers; they may give it to the
senate alone, or the president and senate combined; they
may vest it in the whole congress, or they may reserve it to
57
be exercised by this house.
These considerations, taken together, suggest that the Constitution necessarily vests the removal authority somewhere by default.
They do not foreclose the possibility that the Necessary and Proper
Clause or Congress's authority to vary the mode of appointment of
inferior officers encompasses a power to constrain whatever removal
authority the Constitution confers by default. Madison's comments,
however, indicate that Congress's power to regulate the exercise of
removal authority cannot be unlimited. 58 To evaluate that claim, we
must consider the source of any limits on congressional authority. Article II provides one possible source of such limits.
C. Article II: The Vesting Clause and the Obligation of Faithful
Execution as Sources of Removal Authority
The opening clause of Article II of the Constitution provides that
"[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
CONGRESSIONAL REGISTER, June 17, 1789, reprinted in DEBATES
1789, supra note 45, at 921-22 (statement of Rep. Madison); see also DAILY
56
57

22, 1789, reprinted in

DEBATES JUNE-SEPTEMBER

JUNE-SEPTEMBER
ADVERTISER,

June

1789, supra note 45, at 895 (summarizing

Madison's objection to the proposition that "the power of displacing from office is subject to a
legislative discretion, which is to create and to modify").
58 See Prakash, supra note 29, at 1072 ("[Madison]'s concern was that this theory permitted Congress to modify or abridge the President's removal power and that Congress conceivably
could decide not to grant a removal power at all.").
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The meaning of Article II's Vesting Clause re-

mains the subject of intense debate. Some commentators claim that
the Vesting Clause is not a grant of power at all, but merely identifies
the person who is to exercise the authorities enumerated in other
parts of Article 11.60 Others contrast the Vesting Clause of Article II
with the Vesting Clause of Article 1,61 which confers on Congress only
"[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted. ' 62 Based on this distinction, as

well as a number of other historical and structural arguments, such
commentators argue that Article II's grant of the executive power to
the President carries with it a core of powers recognized as executive
in nature and yet consistent with the republican form of government
that the Constitution established. 63 Article II also requires the President to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." 64 The Take
Care Clause imposes an obligation on the President rather than granting a power to him.65 That observation does not mean that the Take
Care Clause carries no power with it, for the Clause must carry with it
66
the necessary powers to fulfill that obligation.

§ 1, cl.1.
See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and
Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 546-53 (2004) (rejecting the argument that the Vesting
Clause "implicitly grants the President a broad array of residual powers not specified in the
remainder of Article II"); A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency's New Vestments, 88
Nw. U. L. REV. 1346, 1363-65 (1994) (noting that "[tihe chief problem with reading the Vesting
Clause[ I as [a]grant[ ] of 'executive' . . . power is that we have no clear idea what those words
mean in the context of the Constitution other than from the text of the articles that follow").
61 See Froomkin, supra note 60, at 1362-63 (outlining the debate over contrasting Article
I's Vesting Clause with Article II's).
62 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
63 See STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. Yoo, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 3-4 (2008) (arguing that the Vesting Clause of
Article II "is a grant to the president of all the executive power," and that the President's powers
go "beyond those specifically enumerated in Article It" to include "the power to remove and
direct all lower-level executive officials"); Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power
Grants, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1377, 1389-400 (1994) (arguing that any governmental action not
involving legislation or adjudication "must be an executive action which the President can control"); Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701,
704 ("Vested with [the executive power], the president may execute any federal law by himself,
whatever a federal statute might provide.... The president also may control other government
officials who execute federal law.").
64 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
65 See, e.g., Manning, supra note 25, at 2036 n.480 (referring to the "undeniable fact that
the Take Care Clause is framed as a duty rather than as a power").
66 See id. at 2036 ("Since well-settled rules of implication suggest that the imposition of a
duty implicitly connotes a grant of power minimally sufficient to see that duty fulfilled, the Take
Care Clause seems straightforwardly to call for the recognition of sufficient 'executive Power' to
allow the President to remove subordinates who, in his or her view, are not faithfully implementing governing law.").
59 U.S. CONST. art. II,
60
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The question, then, is whether the Vesting Clause or the Take
Care Clause gives rise to a presidential removal authority. During the
House debates over creation of the executive departments, representatives cited both the Vesting Clause and the Take Care Clause to support the proposition that Article II itself confers removal authority on
the President. Accounts of Madison's comments on this question are
worth examining in detail:
I agree that if nothing more was said in the constitution than
that the president, by and with the advice and consent of the
senate, should appoint to office, there would be great force
in saying that the power of removal resulted by a natural implication from the power of appointing. But there is another
part of the constitution, no less explicit ...[;] it is that part

which declares, that the executive power shall be vested in a
president of the United States. The association of the senate
with the president in exercising that particular function, is an
exception to this general rule; and exceptions to general
rules, I conceive, are ever to be taken strictly. But there is
another part of the constitution which inclines in my judgment, to favor the construction I put upon it; the president is
required to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. If
the duty to see the laws faithfully executed be required at the
hands of the executive magistrate, it would seem that it was
generally intended he should have that species of power
which is necessary to accomplish that end.67
Madison's comments related in part to the question whether the
Senate should have a role in removing principal officers. Madison's
answer was that it should not.68 His comments, however, also went to
the broader question whether the removal power was part of the "executive Power" that the Constitution vests in the President: "Is the
power of displacing an executive power? I conceive that if any power
whatsoever is in its nature executive it is the power of appointing,
overseeing, and controling those who execute the laws." 69 Others
67

CONGRESSIONAL REGISTER, June

17, 1789, reprinted in

DEBATES JUNE-SEPTEMBER

1789, supra note 45, at 922 (statement of Rep. Madison); see also DAILY

1789, reprinted in DEBATES

JUNE-SEPTEMBER

ADVERTISER,

June 22,

1789, supra note 45, at 896 (providing a similar

account of Madison's comments).
68 See Prakash, supra note 29, at 1040 (noting that Madison held his view "with the zeal of
a convert").
69 CONGRESSIONAL REGISTER, June 16, 1789, reprinted in DEBATES JUNE-SEPTEMBER
1789, supra note 45, at 868 (statement of Rep. Madison); see also DAILY ADVERTISER, June 18,
1789, reprinted in DEBATES JUNE-SEPTEMBER 1789, supra note 45, at 846 (providing a similar

account of Madison's remarks).
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shared the view that the executive power encompassed a power of
removal.

70

Madison reinforced his argument about the executive nature of
the removal power with an argument about the Take Care Clause.
For Madison, the duty the Take Care Clause imposed carried at least

some presidential removal power with it.71 One could also argue that
the conferral of the executive power on the President, just as much as
the Take Care Clause, obliges the President to faithfully execute the
laws, and that this obligation to execute carries with it the powers necessary to achieve that end. During the 1789 debates, others made arguments similar to Madison's about the President's inability to
accomplish his duty to the country-whether a duty imposed by the
executive power itself or by the Take Care Clause-without the power
72

of removal.
The 1789 statutes creating the executive departments 73 are consistent with the recognition of an Article II-derived presidential removal
power, whether it is part and parcel of the Vesting Clause's "executive
Power" or implied in the duty of faithful execution that the Vesting or
the Take Care Clauses impose. As noted earlier, the statutes themselves are also consistent with other theories of the source of removal
authority. The controversy over whether the actions of the First Congress signal a "Decision of 1789" 74 on the scope of Article II stems not
from the statutory language, but from a succession of votes on earlier
bills. In particular, when the House considered a draft bill to create
70 See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL REGISTER, May 19, 1789, reprinted in DEBATES APRIL-MAY
1789, supra note 45, at 738 (statement of Rep. Clymer) ("[T]he power of removal was an executive power, and as such belonged to the president alone, by the express words of the constitution,
'the executive power shall be vested in a president of the United States of America."'); see also
Prakash, supra note 29, at 1041 n.143 (arguing that "[a]lthough some Representatives who
thought the Constitution granted the President a removal power also made arguments about the
Appointments Clause, they did not endorse the view that the President had a removal power by
virtue of his power to appoint").
71 See CONGRESSIONAL REGISTER, June 17, 1789, reprinted in DEBATES JUNE-SEPTEMBER
1789, supra note 45, at 922 (statement of Rep. Madison) (observing that the President's duty to
take care that the laws be faithfully executed carries "that species of power which is necessary to
accomplish that end").
72 See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL
REGISTER, June
16, 1789, reprinted in DEBATES
JUNE-SEPTEMBER 1789, supra note 45, at 880 (statement of Rep. Ames) ("The constitution
places all executive power in the hands of the president, and could he personally execute allthe
laws, there would be no occasion for establishing auxiliaries .... But in order that he may be
responsible to his country, he must have a choice in selecting his assistants, a control over them,
with power to remove them when he finds the qualifications which induced their appointment
cease to exist.").
73 See supra text accompanying notes 30-35.
74 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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the Department of Foreign Affairs, the House passed two amendments sponsored by Representative Egbert Benson of New York. The
first sought to alter a provision concerning the chief clerk of the Department. 75 Under Benson's proposal, the clerk would have custody
of departmental papers "whenever the said principal officer shall be
removed from office by the President." 76 The amendment passed by a
vote of thirty to eighteen. 77 Benson then moved to strike language in
the bill providing that the Secretary would be "removable by the President. '78 The House previously had voted to reject such an amendment. 79 Benson, however, argued that he introduced the amendment
to avoid any implication that the power to remove had been legislatively granted. 80 Representative Benson's motion passed by a vote of
thirty-one to nineteen."'
The debate over how to interpret these votes arises from the fact
that the majority coalitions for each of the amendments were quite
different, leading some commentators to conclude that a majority of
the House viewed the final statute as a congressional delegation of the
removal power to the President rather than as a recognition of a constitutionally based removal power.82 Others insist that even those who
voted to retain the language on presidential removal believed that the
President's removal power flows from Article II. Professor Saikrishna
Prakash, for example, with the benefit of archival materials not available to prior commentators, argues that Congress's "Decision of 1789"
was that "the Constitution granted the President the power to remove
'83
secretaries of the executive departments.
75

CONGRESSIONAL REGISTER,

June 22, 1789, reprinted in

DEBATES JUNE-SEPTEMBER

1789, supra note 45, at 1028.
76

JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED

STATES, June 22, 1789,

reprinted in

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JOURNAL, 3 DOCUMENTARY

HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, MARCH 4,

3, 1791, at 91-92 (Linda Grant De Pauw et al. eds., 1977) [hereinafter
Id. at 92.

1789-MARCH
77
78

JOURNAL].

CONGRESSIONAL REGISTER, June 22, 1789, reprinted in DEBATES JUNE-SEPTEMBER

1789, supra note 45, at 1030.
79 See Prakash, supra note 29, at 1031 (noting that the same proposal had been defeated by
a vote of twenty to thirty-four just three days before Benson's proposal).
80 See CONGRESSIONAL REGISTER, June 22, 1789, reprintedin DEBATES JUNE-SEPTEMBER
1789, supra note 45, at 1028 (describing Rep. Benson's motivation as to "establish a legislative
construction of the constitution").
81 JOURNAL, supra note 76, at 93.
82 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 194 (1926) (McReynolds, J., dissenting) ("That
the majority [of the First Congress] did not suppose they had assented to the doctrine under
which the President could remove inferior officers contrary to an inhibition prescribed by Congress, is shown plainly enough .... ").
83 See Prakash, supra note 29, at 1068.
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A conclusion that the Decision of 1789 recognized a presidential
removal power flowing from the grant of executive power or from
presidential obligations of faithful execution, however, still leaves significant questions open. In particular, the question remains whether
the President's power to remove executive officers tolerates any congressional limitations.
D. Congressional Limitations on Removal Authority
The argument that the Constitution grants the President the
power to direct or remove all executive officials is not simply an argument about the source of removal power. It is an argument about the
scope of and limits of that power, whatever its source. To assess the
limits of a presidential removal power, one must look both to "internal" limits stemming from the provisions that might give rise to the
removal power and "external" limits derived from other provisions.
The removal-follows-appointment theory, for example, contains potential internal limits, for it both empowers and restricts the President.
Under the removal-follows-appointment theory, the Appointments
Clause implies a presidential removal authority in the case of principal
officers and inferior officers subject to the default procedure of presidential nomination and Senate advice and consent, but it preempts a
direct presidential removal authority in the case of an inferior officer
84
whose appointment Congress vests in the head of a department.
Similarly, the theory that the duty of faithful execution implies a removal power also suggests a possible limitation on the removal power.
If the duty of faithful execution, derived from the Take Care Clause or
the vesting of the executive power in the President, is the source of
presidential removal authority, then the removal power may extend
only so far as is necessary to ensure faithful execution.
Perhaps more important than the limitations internal to the constitutional sources of removal authority are the potential external limitations, specifically those deriving from Congress's power under the
Necessary and Proper Clause. One could argue that congressional
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to establish an office
includes various "lesser" authorities, such as the power to establish a
term of years during which the officer will serve or to set other terms
and conditions of the office.8 5 Similarly, one could argue that the au84 The theory presumes, of course, that the President supervises inferior officers in the
traditional chain of command, by supervising the department head who appoints and removes
them. See infra text accompanying notes 194-95.

85 See Corwin, supra note 36, at 391-92 ("From the first Congress has exercised its power
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thority to vary the default mode of appointment carries the authority
to limit removal, at least in those cases in which Congress has in fact
varied the mode of appointment.
In short, whatever the 1789 statutes reveal about the source of
the presidential removal authority, they say little about the scope of
and limits on that authority. As the next Part shows, that uncertainty
persists through PCAOB.
II.

FROM THE DECISION OF

1789 TO PCAOB

Part I drew upon the debate over the creation of the key executive departments to identify three possible understandings of the removal authority. The First Congress's statutory acknowledgment of
presidential removal authority is consistent both with the removal-follows-appointment theory and with various conceptions of removal authority stemming from Article II. More, however, is required to
conclude that Congress cannot, through its power to vary the default
mode of appointment of inferior officers or its power under the Necessary and Proper Clause, restrict presidential removal authority in
any way.
This Part traces the removal-follows-appointment and Article II
theories forward to the PCA OB case. Analyzing the removal caselaw
prior to PCAOB shows that the removal-follows-appointment theory
and the Article II theories each have played prominent roles in significant removal cases. Even in those cases in which the Court relies
heavily on Article II, however, the Court does little to connect or disentangle the different possible threads of removal authority, including
the Vesting Clause or the obligation of faithful execution. This lack of
analytical clarity persists through PCAOB.
A.

Removal Authority as Incidental to Appointment Authority

Recall that during the 1789 debate over the creation of the key
executive departments, a number of representatives took the position
6
that the power of appointment carries with it the power of removal.8
Some representatives invoked the removal-follows-appointment theory to support senatorial advice and consent in removal of principal
officers, while others invoked the theory to defeat senatorial involveunder the 'necessary and proper' clause to fix the qualifications of officers, not only in respect to
inferior offices but also in respect to superior offices . . .. [Tihe tenure of an office is also a
matter which Congress may determine when it is necessary and proper for it to do so.").
86 See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
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ment.87 Although some scholars have argued that those who took the
latter approach in fact favored the theory that the Vesting Clause or
the Take Care Clause of Article II confers removal authority on the
President,8 8 the removal-follows-appointment theory played a prominent role in early removal cases.
The removal-follows-appointment theory can operate both as a
sword and as a shield-as noted earlier, under this theory, the Constitution empowers the appointing authority to remove his or her appointees but restrictsremoval by a nonappointing authority or perhaps
even removal outside of limitations imposed by Congress.
Ex parte Hennen89 primarily illustrates the use of the removalfollows-appointment rule as an affirmative source of removal authority. The Hennen Court considered the claim of a district court clerk
whom an incoming district judge purported to remove for the stated
reason of granting the position to a friend. 90 The Court rejected the
proposition that offices are held for life and instead concluded that an
officer who is removable at will is removable by the appointing authority: "[I]t would seem to be a sound and necessary rule, to consider
the power of removal as incident to the power of appointment."' 91 The
clerk had argued that the Decision of 1789 showed that in fact the
power of removal does not follow the power of appointment; rather,
the Decision of 1789 rested on a theory of presidential authority to
control his agents in the performance of his duties-a theory that did
not extend to the relationship between a judge and a clerk. 92 The
Court rejected this understanding of the Decision of 1789, interpreting
the 1789 statutes as precluding the involvement of the Senate rather
than as disclaiming the removal-follows-appointment rule
93
altogether.
87

See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.

88 See supra text accompanying note 83.
89

Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839).

90 Id. at 232.
91 Id. at 259.
Id. at 234-35 ("It is perfectly manifest ... that these proceedings of the Congress of
1789, cannot justly be considered as a legislative exposition of the Constitution, that the power of
appointment necessarily implies a power of removal.... It is equally apparent, that the arguments advanced on that occasion in favour of the executive power of removal, leave the case at
bar untouched" because "[w]idely different is the relation which subsists between the Court and
its clerk.").
92

93 Id. at 259 ("No one denied the power of the President and Senate, jointly, to remove,
where the tenure of the office was not fixed by the Constitution; which was a full recognition of
the principle that the power of removal was incident to the power of appointment.").
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In dictum, the Hennen Court went on to discuss the operation of
the removal-follows-appointment rule with respect to inferior officers
within the executive branch, using language that is sometimes the
source of the argument that the removal-follows-appointment rule is a
shield-i.e., that the rule precludes removal by a nonappointing authority. 94 In the executive departments,
power is given to the secretary, to appoint all necessary
clerks; and although no power to remove is expressly given,
yet there can be no doubt, that these clerks hold their office
at the will and discretion of the head of the department. It
would be a most extraordinary construction of the law, that
all these offices were to be held during life, which must inevitably follow, unless the incumbent was removable at the discretion of the head of the department: the President has
95
certainly no power to remove.
The Court's dictum in Hennen affirming the removal-follows-appointment theory and rejecting presidential removal where the President is not the appointing authority proved influential in subsequent
cases. The 1886 case of United States v. Perkins96 treated the removalfollows-appointment theory as a shield-in this case, as a source of
congressional power to limit the appointing authority's exercise of the
removal power over inferior officers. 97 In Perkins, a naval engineer
claimed that he was an officer whose tenure was protected under a
statute providing that "'[n]o officer in the military or naval service
shall in time of peace be dismissed from service except upon and in
pursuance of the sentence of a court-martial to that effect."' 98 The
Supreme Court adopted in full the reasoning of the Court of Claims 99:
after concluding that the naval engineer was in fact an officer falling
within the terms of the statute, the Court of Claims had rejected the
argument that the statutorily imposed limitations on removal infringed the executive power.1 °0 The Supreme Court quoted the Court
of Claims:
94 See, e.g., The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress,
20 Op. O.L.C. 124, 166 (1996) (citing Hennen for the proposition that "inferior officers appointed by a department head were not removable by the President (absent statutory authorization to do so) but by the secretary who appointed them").
95 Id. at 259-60 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
96 United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886).

98

Id. at 484-85.
Id. at 484 (quoting Act of Aug. 5, 1882, § 1229, 22 Stat. 219).

99

Id. at 485.

97

100

See id.
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Whether or not Congress can restrict the power of removal
incident to the power of appointment of those officers who
are appointed by the President by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate under the authority of the Constitution
does not arise in this case and need not be considered.
We have no doubt that when Congress, by law, vests the
appointment of inferior officers in the heads of Departments,
it may limit and restrict the power of removal as it deems
best for the public interest. The constitutional authority in
Congress to thus vest the appointment implies authority to
limit, restrict, and regulate the removal by such laws as Congress may enact in relation to the officers so appointed.
The head of a Department has no constitutional prerogative of appointment to offices independently of the legislation of Congress, and by such legislation he must be
governed, not only in making appointments but in all that is
incident thereto. 10 1
In Myers v. United States,10 2 the twentieth-century removal case

that is most often associated with an Article II-based removal authority, the Court also explored both the enabling and the restrictive facets of the removal-follows-appointment theory. In Myers, the Court
considered the constitutionality of a statute that purported to require
senatorial advice and consent for the removal of a first-class postmaster during a four-year term of office. 10 3 After Myers was removed
without the Senate's consent, he sued for salary owed to him from the
°4
time of his removal to the expiration of his four-year term.
In considering whether Congress could constitutionally impose a
requirement of Senate advice and consent to removal in this context,
the Court discussed in detail the 1789 debate preceding adoption of
the statutes creating the executive departments. 105 The Court emphasized evidence that the Vesting Clause or the Take Care Clause car101 Id. at 484-85 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
102 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
103 Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 179, § 6, 19 Stat. 78, 80 ("Postmasters of the first, second, and
third classes shall be appointed and may be removed by the President by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, and shall hold their offices for four years unless sooner removed or suspended according to law ....
). The provision was similar to one included in the controversial
Tenure of Office Act passed in 1867 and repealed in 1887. See Tenure of Office Act, ch. 154, § 1,
14 Stat. 430, 430 (1867), repealedby Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 353, 24 Stat. 500; Myers, 272 U.S.
at 166-69 (describing the enactment and repeal of the Tenure of Office Act and noting the
passage of acts concerning the Post Office during this interval).
104 Myers, 272 U.S. at 106.
105

See id. at 111-32.
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ried a presidential removal authority. 10 6 Yet the Court also
acknowledged the removal-follows-appointment theory in several
ways. First, the Court suggested that Madison and others who viewed
removal as an executive power saw the Appointments Clause as reinforcing the theory that the Senate should have no role in removal:
The view of Mr. Madison and his associates was that not only
did the grant of executive power to the President in the first
section of Article II carry with it the power of removal, but
the express recognition of the power of appointment in the
second section enforced this view on the well approved principle of constitutional and statutory construction that the
power of removal of executive officers was incident to the
power of appointment ....

This principle as a rule of consti-

tutional and statutory construction, then generally conceded,
has been recognized ever since. The reason for the principle
is that those in charge of and responsible for administering
functions of government who select their executive subordinates need in meeting their responsibility to have the power
to remove those whom they appoint. 10 7
Despite initially focusing on the removal-follows-appointment
theory as reinforcing the claim that Article II is the source of an executive removal authority, the Court elsewhere acknowledged the Appointments Clause as a possible source of congressional authority to
restrict removal of inferior officers. 10 8 The Court concluded, however,
that the authority to impose removal restrictions is triggered only
when Congress opts to remove an officer from the default mode of
presidential appointment with senatorial advice and consent. 10 9 Con-

106

See infra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.

107

Myers, 272 U.S. at 119 (citations omitted).

108 Id. at 126-27 ("[B]y the specific constitutional provision for appointment of executive
officers with its necessary incident of removal, the power of appointment and removal is clearly
provided for by the Constitution, and the legislative power of Congress in respect to both is

excluded save by the specific exception as to inferior offices in the clause that follows [i.e., U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, providing that Congress may vest the appointment of inferior officers in
nonpresidential offices].... By the plainest implication [the clause concerning inferior officers]
excludes Congressional dealing with appointments or removals of executive officers not falling
within the exception, and leaves unaffected the executive power of the President to appoint and
remove them." (emphasis added)).
109 Id. at 162 ("The condition upon which the power of Congress to provide for the removal
of inferior officers rests is that it shall vest the appointment in some one other than the President
with the consent of the Senate. Congress may not obtain the power and provide for the removal
of such officer except on that condition.").
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gress had not done so in the case of the position to which the President had appointed Myers. 10
As is well known, in Humphrey's Executor v. United States,111 the

Court repudiated substantial portions of the Myers Court's reasoning,
at least as to officers with adjudicative functions. In the Federal Trade
Commission Act,' 1 2 Congress had provided that Commissioners of the
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") were removable only for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.1 113 The Court sustained this restriction. 114 Congress's lodging of the removal authority
in the President, with restrictions, made it unnecessary for the Court
to consider the power of appointment as a source of removal authority. The decision nevertheless has interesting implications for the Myers Court's theory that it is Congress's decision to remove an inferior
officer from the default mode of presidential appointment and Senate
advice and consent that triggers Congress's power to attach conditions
on removal.11 5 There was no contention that members of the FTC
were inferior officers. The Humphrey's Executor Court thus implicitly
rejected the Appointments Clause as the source of Congress's authority to restrict removal, in favor of an apparently broader theory of
congressional authority to restrict removal under the Necessary and

Proper Clause. 16 In Humphrey's Executor, the Court identified no
outer limit of this authority, although the facts of the case confined the
holding to circumstances in which the officer performs adjudicative
7
functions (or at least does not perform purely executive functions).1
The Court jettisoned this limit in Morrison v. Olson when it sustained the creation of the Office of the Independent Counsel. 118 It did
110 Id. at 163 (concluding that because postmasters are appointed by the President with the
consent of the Senate, they are "subject to removal by the President alone, and any legislation to
the contrary must fall as in conflict with the Constitution").
111 Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
112 Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914).
§ 1, 38 Stat. at 718.
Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631-32 (1935).
115 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
116 See Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 629 ("The authority of Congress, in creating quasilegislative or quasi-judicial agencies, to require them to act in discharge of their duties independently of executive control cannot well be doubted; and that authority includes, as an appropriate incident, power to fix the period during which they shall continue in office, and to forbid
their removal except for cause in the meantime.").
117 See id. at 624 (noting that an unlimited presidential removal power would "threaten[]
the independence of a commission, which is not only wholly disconnected from the executive
department, but which.., was created by Congress as a means of carrying into operation legislative and judicial powers").
118 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689-91 (1988) ("[Olur present considered view is that
113
114
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so, however, with respect to an officer whom the Court deemed inferior1 19 and who was subject to an interbranch appointment.120 While
acknowledging the vitality of congressional limits on the removal of
inferior executive officers (without identifying the source of those limits),121

the Court also recognized the possibility that in the case of an

interbranch appointment, placing the removal authority with the ap122
pointing authority could raise constitutional questions.
B. Article H and Removal Authority
We can now consider the extent to which the key reinoval cases
discussed above rely on a theory that Article II confers removal power
on the President. In Ex parte Hennen, as noted, the Court explored
this theory in the context of the removal of an official outside of the
executive branch. 123 The Court ultimately concluded that the Decision of 1789 recognized a removal power flowing from the appointment power. 124 Of course, because Hennen did not address the scope
of Congress's power to limit the appointing authority's removal, it had
no occasion to mark the constitutional boundaries of that authority.
Perkins, by contrast, dealt more directly with the claim that Congress lacks the power to regulate the removal of executive officialsthat the executive power encompasses an unfettered authority to direct or remove executive officials. 125 In the case of an officer whose
appointment Congress had vested in a department head, the Court
rejected that theory, but again failed to identify the outer boundaries
126
of Congress's authority.
The Myers Court, addressing a requirement of senatorial consent
to removal, gave the most sustained attention to the question of executive authority to remove executive officials. The Court considered
the determination of whether the Constitution allows Congress to impose a 'good cause'-type
restriction on the President's power to remove an official cannot be made to turn on whether or
not that official is classified as 'purely executive."').
119 Id. at 691.
120 The Independent Counsel was appointed by a special court upon the Attorney General's application. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 592, 92 Stat. 1824,
1868; Morrison, 487 U.S. at 660-61.
121 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689 n.27.
122 See id. at 693 n.33 (noting that judicial reviewability of a removal decision "does not
inject the Judicial Branch into the removal decision," and implying that doing so could burden
the "President's exercise of executive authority").
123 Ex Parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 256 (1839).
124 See supra text accompanying notes 93-95.
125 See supra text accompanying notes 97-100.
126 See supra text accompanying note 101.
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two aspects of Article II: the Vesting Clause and the Take Care
Clause. First, the Court marshaled Founding-era evidence that the executive power, as a technical matter, includes the authority to remove
executive officials. 127 Drawing upon the debate in the First Congress
over the creation of the executive departments, the Court focused on
Madison's argument that the executive power encompasses the power
of removal. 128 The Court likewise noted that, in the debates, "[iut was
urged that the natural meaning of the term 'executive power' granted
the President included the appointment and removal of executive subordinates. If such appointments and removals were not an exercise of
the executive power, what were they?"' 129 The Court acknowledged
that in state and colonial governments at the time of the Founding, the
appointment and removal powers had sometimes been lodged with
the legislatures or the courts.130 The Court characterized such systems
as "vesting part of the executive power in another branch of the Government"; thus, the fact that the removal power was lodged with legislatures or courts did not mean that it was not by its nature
executive. 131 The Court reasoned that those who framed the Constitution would have looked to the British system under which the Crown
had the power of appointment and removal of executive officers: "[I]t
was natural ...

for those who framed our Constitution to regard the

words 'executive power' as including both [appointment and removal
power]. ' ' 132 After extensive discussion of secondary authorities, the
Court concluded that "the executive power of the Government" includes "the power of appointment and removal of executive
officers."1 33
Second, the Myers Court considered the implications of the duty
of faithful execution that the Take Care Clause of Article II imposes.
The Court noted that
[a]s [the President] is charged specifically to take care that
[the laws] be faithfully executed, the reasonable implication,
even in the absence of express words, was that as part of his
127 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 110-18 (1926) (discussing debates at the constitutional convention and in the First Congress over the role of the various branches in removing
executive officers).
128 Id. at 115-16 ("Mr. Madison insisted that Article II by vesting the executive power in
the President was intended to grant to him the power of appointment and removal of executive
officers except as thereafter expressly provided in that Article.").
129 Id. at 117.
130 Id. at 118.
131

Id.

132

Id.

133 Id. at 163-64.
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executive power he should select those who were to act for
134
him under his direction in the execution of the laws.
Likewise, in examining the Decision of 1789, the Court characterized the actions of Congress as affirming that the Constitution did not
give the Congress or the Senate
the means of thwarting the Executive ... by fastening upon
him, as subordinate executive officers, men who by their
inefficient service under him, by their lack of loyalty to the
service, or by their different views of policy, might make his
taking care that the laws be faithfully executed most difficult
or impossible.13S
In the Court's view, the President's obligation to take care that
the laws be faithfully executed "confirmed" that the President's executive power encompasses the authority to remove executive officials. 136 To hold that the President lacked the sole power to remove
executive officials would "make it impossible for the President, in case
of political or other differences with the Senate or Congress, to take
'137
care that the laws be faithfully executed.
For the Myers Court, Article II was both a source of the President's removal authority and a limit on Congress's power to constrain
that authority. Yet the Court never clarified how the Vesting Clause
and the Take Care Clause related to one another. For example, if the
executive power itself precludes congressional interference with removal authority, then the Take Care Clause adds little to the analysis.
If instead the contours of the removal authority conferred by the executive power are not easily'identified, then the Take Care Clause may
inform assessment of the scope of that authority, on the theory that
the duty of faithful execution implies whatever power is necessary to
carry out that duty.
The cases limiting Myers's understanding of the executive power
demonstrate this analytical difficulty. Humphrey's Executor, for example, confined Myers to officials who engage in purely executive
functions 138 and focused heavily on the adjudicative (what the Court
termed "quasi-judicial") functions of the FTC. 139 Because the FTC,
134
135
136

Id. at 117.
Id. at 131.
Id. at 163-64.

Id. at 164.
Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627-28 (1935) ("[Tlhe necessary reach
of [Myers] goes far enough to include all purely executive officers. It goes no farther.").
139 Id. at 629.
137

138

1398

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:1371

even in 1935, exercised substantial enforcement powers, 140
Humphrey's Executor is inconsistent with a theory that the executive
power includes unfettered removal authority of all officers exercising
executive authority. The question is whether Humphrey's Executor is
inconsistent with the more modest conception of presidential removal
authority that might flow from the President's duty of faithful execution. 141 That is, if the duty of faithful execution implies a power of
removal, that power extends only so far as is necessary to ensure the
President's faithful execution of the laws. Humphrey's Executor thus
raises the possibility that where adjudicative functions are involved,
unfettered presidential removal authority is not necessary for faithful
execution of the laws. Although one needs a separate explanation for
insulating from removal those who perform a mix of functions, the
duty of faithful execution may not lead to an unlimited presidential
removal authority in all cases.
Morrison v. Olson likewise suggests that the duty of faithful execution provides a softer limit on congressional power than does a conclusion that the executive power itself encompasses removal authority.
The Morrison Court did not fully analyze the duty of faithful execution the Constitution imposes or any power of removal that duty
might entail. The Court's more functional approach, however, asked
whether Congress's limitation on removal of the Independent Counsel-concededly an officer who performs purely executive func143
tions142-impermissibly interferes with the executive function.
Although the Court never fully explored the duty of faithful execution, instead implying that the President can ensure faithful execution
of the laws so long as a statute does not "completely strip[ ]"144 the
President's power to remove, the question the Morrison Court posed
bears some similarity to the assessment whether a removal limitation
unduly jeopardizes the President's fulfillment of the duty of faithful
execution.
140 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689-90 n.28 (1988) ("[I]t is hard to dispute that the
powers of the FTC at the time of Humphrey's Executor would at the present time be considered
'executive,' at least to some degree.").
141

See supra text accompanying notes 134-37.

Morrison,487 U.S. at 691 ("There is no real dispute that the functions performed by the
independent counsel are 'executive' in the sense that they are law enforcement functions that
typically have been undertaken by officials within the Executive Branch.").
142

143 Id. at 689-90 (describing the proper analysis as "designed ...to ensure that Congress
does not interfere with the President's exercise of the 'executive power' and his constitutionally
appointed duty to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed' under Article II").
144

Id. at 692.

2012]

PCAOB AND THE PERSISTENCE OF THE REMOVAL PUZZLE 1399

Justice Scalia's dissent in Morrison arguably reveals a third ap-

proach connecting Article II with the removal power. Justice Scalia's
dissent does not specifically cast removal authority as part and parcel
of the executive power. 145 Rather, he identifies the investigative and
prosecutorial functions the Independent Counsel performs as core ex-

ecutive functions

46

and argues that Congress cannot deny the Presi-

dent exclusive control, through supervision and removal, of those
functions. 147 This inferential approach-where the question is not
whether removal is technically an executive power, but rather whether
the need for control over other executive powers demands a removal
power of a particular scope-shares much with the analysis described
148
above of the obligation of faithful execution.
III.

PCAOB's REMOVAL THEORIES

The PCAOB case demonstrates the persistence of these funda-

mental questions about the source and limits of removal authority.
Although PCAOB does not complete the removal puzzle, tracing the
thread of the Court's decision exposes some shifting methodological

ground for evaluating removal disputes. This Part begins by exploring
the dispute over the structure of the PCAOB and sketching the

Court's holding. It then turns back to the removal theories explored
in Parts I and II. At first blush, the PCAOB decision appears to re-

flect an attempt to re-set the terms of the removal debate, by empha145 Id. at 724 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting the argument that the executive power
encompasses an unfettered removal power in favor of a theory requiring that "the President ...
have control over all exercises of the executive power").
146 Id. at 726 (describing the prosecutorial function as "the virtual embodiment of the
power to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed"').
147 Id. ("[T]he President ha[s] to be the repository of all executive power, which, as Myers
carefully explained, necessarily means that he must be able to discharge those who do not perform executive functions according to his liking." (citation omitted)).
148 See supra text accompanying notes 134-37. Justice Scalia's discussion of the removal
limitations refers to the Take Care Clause, but only in the context of describing the prosecutorial
function as "the virtual embodiment of the power to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed."' Morrison, 487 U.S. at 726 (Scalia, J., dissenting). That is, Justice Scalia does not reason
from the obligation of faithful execution of the laws to a power to remove executive officials.
Rather, his assumption that the investigative and prosecutorial functions are executive in nature,
along with the assumption that Congress cannot restrict the exercise of executive functions, produces the conclusion that the statutory scheme is unconstitutional. One could argue, as Professor Manning does, that the analysis is missing a step. See Manning, supra note 25, at 1967
("Because [the Necessary and Proper Clause] ... expressly grants Congress at least some authority to structure the way the executive and judicial powers are 'carr[ied] into Execution,' one
cannot establish a constitutional violation simply by showing that Congress has constrained the
way '[t]he executive Power' is implemented." (second alteration in original) (quoting U.S.
CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18)).

1400

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:1371

sizing the textual and formal threads of past removal disputes and
invoking a Vesting Clause-centered removal theory. As will become
clear, however, PCAOB cannot be taken seriously as an endorsement
of the proposition that the vesting of executive power in the President
confers an unfettered power to direct or remove subordinates.
PCAOB in fact validates the rejection of such a theory. To understand PCAOB's methodological and practical implications, then, we
must assess what remains after the collapse of PCAOB's Vesting
Clause edifice.
A.

The PCAOB Dispute and Decision

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002149 ended the system of auditor
self-regulation that many perceived to have contributed to a series of
150
accounting debacles, including those at Enron and WorldCom.
Congress created the PCAOB "to oversee the audit of public companies that are subject to the securities laws" 151 and granted the PCAOB
broad powers to regulate public accounting firms that prepare audit
reports for securities issuers. 152 More specifically, the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act requires that such firms register with the PCAOB and provide
detailed information on their operations; 153 empowers the PCAOB to
issue rules governing the preparation of audit reports; 154 authorizes
the PCAOB to "conduct a continuing program of inspections to assess
the degree of compliance of each registered public accounting firm"
with statutory, regulatory, and professional auditing standards; 15 5 and
permits the PCAOB to set rules for investigating and disciplining registered public accounting firms. 156 The statute also gives the Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC") certain oversight and enforcement authority over the PCAOB. 157 For example, the statute requires
prior SEC approval of PCAOB rules; 158 authorizes the SEC to review
or modify sanctions imposed by the PCAOB on registered firms;159
149 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7266 (2006).
150 See, e.g., Eliott J. Weiss, Some Thoughts on an Agenda for the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 53 DUKE L.J. 491, 491-92 (2003).
151 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a).
152 Id. §§ 7211(c), 7213-7215.
153 Id. § 7212.
154
155
156
157
158

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

159 Id.

§ 7213(a)(1).
§ 7214(a).
§ 7215(a).
§ 7217.
§ 7217(b)(2).
§ 7217(c).
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and permits the SEC to rescind the PCAOB's authority to enforce
compliance with auditing standards. 160
6
The PCAOB has five members, who are appointed by the SEC 1
"from among prominent individuals of integrity and reputation who
have a demonstrated commitment to the interests of investors and the
public."'1 62 To ensure that the PCAOB can attract qualified members,
the statute provides that PCAOB members are not to be considered
officers or employees of the United States, 163 thus freeing the PCAOB

from the standard government pay scale. 164 Members serve staggered
five-year terms, 165 but the SEC may remove members from office "for
good cause shown" and subject to certain procedures. 166 More specifically, removal can occur only after the SEC finds, "on the record, after
notice and opportunity for a hearing," that the PCAOB member:
(A) has willfully violated any provision of [the SarbanesOxley] Act, the rules of the [PCAOB], or the securities laws;
(B) has willfully abused the authority of that member; or
(C) without reasonable justification or excuse, has failed to
enforce compliance with any such provision or rule, or any
professional standard by any registered public accounting
167
firm or any associated person thereof.
In 2005, after inspecting Beckstead and Watts, LLP, a small Nevada accounting firm registered with the PCAOB, the PCAOB filed a
report critical of the firm's auditing procedures. 168 Beckstead and
Watts, along with the nonprofit group Free Enterprise Fund, of which
the firm is a member, filed suit against the PCAOB. 169 Among other
160 Id. § 7217(d)(1).
161 Id. § 7211(e)(1), (e)(4). The statute requires the SEC to consult with the Chairman of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Secretary of the Treasury before
making an appointment. Id. § 7211(e)(4).
162 Id. § 7211(e)(1).
163 See also id. § 7211(a)-(b) (providing that the PCAOB will operate as a nonprofit corporation and not as "an agency or establishment of the United States Government" and that its
members, employees, and agents shall not "be deemed to be ...officer(s) or employee(s) of or
agent(s) for the Federal Government by reason of such service").
164 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147 (2010)
(noting that PCAOB members' annual salaries ranged, at the time of litigation, from $547,000 to
$673,000 for the Board's Chairman).
165

15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(5).

166 Id. § 7211(e)(6).
167

Id. § 7217(d)(3).

168 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., No. 06-0217 (JR), 2007 WL
891675, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2007), affid, 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008), rev'd in part, 130 S.Ct.
3138 (2010).
169 Id. at *1.
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things, the plaintiffs argued that the PCAOB's for-cause removal provisions violated the Constitution's separation of powers. 170 Although
the statute creating the SEC is silent on the circumstances under
which the President can remove the SEC Commissioners, the United
States and the plaintiffs agreed that the Commissioners are removable
only for cause. 171 Thus, the plaintiffs claimed, the PCAOB members
were impermissibly insulated from removal by two layers of for-cause
protection.172
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 173 and the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 7 4-the latter over a dissent by Judge Kavanaugh175-sustained the constitutionality of the removal scheme. The Supreme Court reversed, holding by a vote of five
to four that the two levels of tenure protection for PCAOB members-with PCAOB members removable only for cause by SEC Commissioners who are themselves removable only for cause-rendered
17 6
the PCAOB's structure unconstitutional.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts framed the question as whether the dual for-cause removal provision was consistent
with the Constitution's "vesting of the executive power in the President. 1 77 The Court canvassed key removal precedents and determined that they did not resolve that question. In particular, although
Humphrey's Executor v. United States sustained for-cause tenure protection for members of the Federal Trade Commission 178 and Morrison v. Olson upheld for-cause tenure protection of the Independent
170 Id. at *5. The plaintiffs also claimed that members of the PCAOB were appointed in
violation of the Appointments Clause; PCAOB members, the plaintiffs argued, are principal
officers who must be appointed by and with the consent of the Senate. Id. at *4; see U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The plaintiffs claimed in the alternative that even if PCAOB members are
"inferior" officers whose appointment Congress could vest "in the President alone, in the Courts
of Law, or in the Heads of Departments," U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, Congress did not do so;
Congress vested the appointment authority in the SEC, see 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(4)(A). The
plaintiffs claimed that the SEC is not a "Department[ ]," and that even if it is a Department, the
SEC Commissioners collectively (as opposed to just the Chairman of the SEC) cannot serve as
the Department's "Head[ ]." U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see Free Enter. Fund, 2007 WL
891675, at *4.
171 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
172 See Free Enter. Fund, 2007 WL 891675, at *5-6.
173 Id. at *6.
174 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 685 (D.C. Cir.
2008), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
175 Id. at 685-715 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
176 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3151-54
(2010).
177 Id. at 3147.
178 Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935).
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Counsel 1 79 each case involved only a single layer of tenure protection. 180 The Court concluded that the PCAOB's second layer of tenure protection was relevant, because with that layer, the President
"can neither ensure that the laws are faithfully executed, nor be held
responsible for a Board member's breach of faith."' 81
The Court rejected the PCAOB's argument that despite the limitations on the SEC's power to remove PCAOB members, the SEC
exercises extensive control over the PCAOB.1 82 As noted, in addition
to controlling the PCAOB's budget, 183 the SEC has control over
whether the PCAOB's rules and sanctions become final.1 84 Moreover,
the SEC can "refieve" the PCAOB of its enforcement authority. 185
The United States and the PCAOB contended that the SEC's control
over the PCAOB meant that the President had as much control over
the PCAOB's functions as he would have had if Congress had lodged
the PCAOB's relevant functions with the SEC itself. 86 The Court rejected that argument on the ground that the SEC's "[b]road power
over Board functions is not equivalent to the power to remove Board
members."'18 7 In addition, the Court concluded that the PCAOB is
empowered to take significant enforcement actions independently of
the Commission, and that those functions are subject only to "latent
88
Commission control.'
Finally, the Court dismissed claims that invalidating the
PCAOB's two-layer tenure protections would disrupt longstanding
congressional practice. The Court found that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
is "highly unusual in committing substantial executive authority to officers protected by two layers of for-cause removal."' 8 9 According to
the Court, the parties had identified "only a handful of isolated posiMorrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691-92 (1988).
See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S.Ct. at 3153 (calling the removal restrictions in Myers and
Humphrey's Executor "limited restrictions on the President's removal power," while the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act "does something quite different").
181 Id. at 3154.
182 Id. at 3158-59.
183 15 U.S.C. § 7219(b) (2006).
184 Id. § 7217(b)(2), (c)(2)-(3).
185 Id. § 7217(d)(1).
186 See Brief for the United States at 47-48, Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) (No. 08-861); Brief for Respondents Public Co. Accounting
Oversight Board at 15-18, Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (No. 08-861); see also Pildes, supra
note 11, at 491 ("[T]he Board functions under the direct and full legal oversight and control of
179
180

the SEC.").
187 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S.Ct. at 3158.
188 Id. at 3159.
189

Id.
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tions" with such features.'g 0 In response to Justice Breyer's claim in
dissent that the Court's decision would call into question the constitutionality of a variety of existing institutional structures, including the
use of the civil service system within the independent agencies and the
tenure protection of administrative law judges ("ALJs"), 191 the Court

insisted that the positions the dissent identified are not similarly situated to the PCAOB. 92
Having held that the PCAOB's two-layer tenure protection was
unconstitutional, the Court turned to the question whether the freedom from presidential control engendered by that protection required
invalidation of the entire PCAOB structure. The Court concluded
that it did not, because the tenure protection was severable from the
remainder of the statute. 93 Without the good-cause restrictions on
the SEC's power to remove PCAOB members, the Court stated, the
PCAOB would be subject to the "default rule" that "removal is incident to the power of appointment.' 1 94 That is, the members of the
PCAOB would be removable by the SEC at will. The Commission
thus would be "fully responsible for the Board's actions, which are no
less subject than the Commission's own functions to Presidential
oversight." 195
190 Id.
191 Id. at 3179-82 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
192 Id. at 3159-60 (majority opinion). Regarding the civil service system, the Court observed that its holding had no relevance to government employees-as opposed to officers-and
that the President has greater tools to ensure control of senior or policymaking positions than he
has to ensure control of the PCAOB. Id. at 3160. Regarding ALJs, the Court reasoned that
Aids: (1) may be employees rather than officers of the United States; (2) may "perform adjudicative rather than enforcement or policymaking functions"; or (3) may "possess purely recommendatory powers." Id. at 3160 n.10.
193 Id. at 3161.
194 Id.
195 Id. The Court also held that the appointment of the PCAOB's members conformed to
the Appointments Clause. Based in part on the fact that the SEC could now remove PCAOB
members at will, the Court first held that members of the PCAOB are "inferior" officers whose
appointment Congress may permissibly vest in the head of a department. ld. at 3162 (quoting
U.S. CO ST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2). Adopting the reasoning of a four-Justice concurrence in Freytag v.
Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991), which defined a department as any "free-standing, self-contained entity in the Executive Branch," id. at 915 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment), the Court concluded that the SEC is a department, Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at
3163. That conclusion raised the question whether the Commissioners could collectively be
viewed as the "Hea[d]" of the SEC for purposes of the Appointments Clause. See Free Enter.
Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3163. Based on legislative acknowledgment that the head of an agency can be
a commission with more than one member, and on past instances of appointments of inferior
officers by multimember bodies-appointments that would be invalid if a multimember body
could not be the head of a department for purposes of the Appointments Clause-the Court
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Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Sotomayor, dissented from the Court's invalidation of the PCAOB's
tenure-protection provision. 196 The dissent focused on the degree of

SEC control over the PCAOB.197 In addition, Justice Breyer argued
that the Court had repeatedly recognized that removal restrictions are
constitutional where they restrict the President's power to remove an
officer with any adjudicatory responsibilities' 98 and where officials
have "technical responsibilities that warrant a degree of special independence."' 199 Justice Breyer also claimed that the Court's decision
would give rise to tremendous uncertainty-potentially affecting
200
"hundreds, perhaps thousands of high level government officials,"
including individuals who are removable only for cause and who serve
within independent agencies whose heads are likewise removable only
for cause; 201 ALJs, removable only through for-cause hearings conducted by the Merit Systems Protection Board, whose members are
themselves protected by a for-cause tenure provision; 202 and many
others. 203
B. PCAOB's Principles?
When we examine PCAOB's reasoning in greater depth, particularly in light of the removal theories considered in Parts I and II, what
appears to be most significant is the Court's turn back to the Vesting
Clause. As will become clear, however, the Vesting Clause cannot
provide the basis for the Court's ultimate decision to invalidate the
second layer of tenure protection and sustain the remainder of the
statutory scheme.
concluded that there was no constitutional infirmity in the appointment of the PCAOB's members by the SEC Commissioners acting jointly. Id. at 3163-64.
196 The four Justices who dissented from the Court's holding did not join the portion of the
Court's opinion addressing the Appointments Clause, but the dissenters would have upheld the

statute in its entirety, signaling unanimity on the Appointments Clause issues. See Free Enter.
Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3164 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
197 Id. at 3172-73.
198 Id. at 3173-74.
199

Id. at 3175.

200 Id. at 3179.
201 Id. at 3179-80; id. at 3185-92 (listing in Appendix A twenty-four departments "in which
a 'for-cause' office is situated within a 'for-cause department'-i.e., instances of 'double forcause' removal that are essentially indistinguishable from [PCAOB]").
202 Id. at 3180-81.

203 See id. at 3181 (noting that numerous commissioned military officers are removable for
cause only by other commissioned military officers who are removable only for cause).
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The Vesting Clause

The notion that the executive power encompassed a power of removal figured prominently in the debate over the creation of the executive departments in 1789.204 It was also critical to the Court's
reasoning in Myers.20 5 In the move away from Myers in Humphrey's

Executor and Morrison, however, any discussion of the executive
power as a source of removal authority receded. The PCAOB Court
appeared to bring the Vesting Clause back to the fore. In PCAOB,
the Court bookended its discussion of the removal question with references to the Vesting Clause. 20 6 The Court also asserted that the removal power is in fact an element of the executive power. It first
quoted an account of James Madison's statement on the floor of the
First Congress that "if any power whatsoever is in its nature Executive, it is the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those
who execute the laws. ' 20 7 The prevailing view in the First Congress,
the Court concluded, was that "the executive power included a power
to oversee executive officers through removal. 20 8 The Court also described the removal power as a "traditional executive power" that,
according to Madison, was not "'expressly taken away"' and which
therefore "'remained with the President.' ' 20 9 The Court closed its
opinion by referring to the removal power as part of the executive
power: "The Constitution that makes the President accountable to the
people for executing the laws also gives him the power to do so. That
power includes, as a general matter, the authority to remove those
2 10
who assist him in carrying out his duties.
A closer look at the Court's decision, however, shows that the
Court's turn back to the Vesting Clause was more rhetorical than substantive. The Court read the Constitution as demanding that the SEC
have unlimited authority to remove PCAOB members.211 The Court,
however, offered no insight into why the executive power might deSee supra Part I.C.
See supra text accompanying notes 127-33.
206 See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3147 ("We hold that such multilevel protection from
removal is contrary to Article II's vesting of the executive power in the President."); id. at 3154
(declaring that the PCAOB's dual for-cause removal limitation "is contrary to Article II's vesting of the executive power in the President").
207 Id. at 3151 (internal quotation marks omitted).
208 Id. at 3151-52.
209 Id. (quoting Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 30, 1789), in 16
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1789-1791, at 893 (Charlene Bangs
Bickford et al. eds., 2004)).
210 Id. at 3164.
211 See id. at 3158-59.
204
205
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mand unlimited removal authority for officials whose tenure Congress
can protect, but not demand unlimited removal authority for the President. If the vesting of the executive power in the President were truly
the source of a requirement of unlimited removal authority, then the
rule would necessarily run upward and demand that the President
have unlimited removal authority over the SEC itself. The Court did
more than simply avoid that question. After severing the PCAOB's
tenure provision, 212 the Court sustained the constitutionality of the
statutory scheme. In so doing, the Court necessarily (though implicitly) rejected any requirement of unlimited removal authority over the
SEC. in short, despite repeatedly invoking Article II's Vesting Clause
and suggesting that the power to oversee executive officials is part of
the "executive Power," the Court did not suggest that the executive
power includes an unlimited presidential power to supervise or remove executive officials. The vesting of the executive power in the
President thus cannot be taken seriously as the basis for the Court's
holding.
2.

The Obligation of Faithful Execution

Like the participants in the 1789 debate and the Court in the prePCAOB cases, the PCAOB Court relied on another aspect of Article
II-the fact that Article II imposes a duty on the President to "take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed. 2 13 The Court treated that
duty of faithful execution as implying a power of oversight: "The President cannot 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed' if he
21t4
cannot oversee the faithfulness of the officers who execute them.
After discussing Madison's view that the executive power included a
power of oversight through removal,2 15 the Court returned to the
power that the Take Care Clause implies for the President: "It is his
responsibility to take care that the laws be faithfully executed ...
[T]he President therefore must have some 'power of removing those
for whom he can not continue to be responsible.' "216 Focusing specifiSee id. at 3161-64.
Id. at 3146 (internal quotation marks omitted).
214 Id. at 3147 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3); see also id. (discussing that the flaw in the
PCAOB's structure is that it lodges the determination whether an officer has properly discharged his or her duties in another officer "who may or may not agree with the President's
determination," and concluding that this structure "contravenes the President's 'constitutional
obligation to ensure the faithful execution of the laws"' (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654, 693 (1988))).
212
213

215

Id. at 3151-52.

216

Id. at 3152 (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926)).
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cally on the structure of the PCAOB-and again immediately after
invoking the scope of the executive power vested by Article Il-the
Court returned to the Take Care Clause theme: In the case of the
PCAOB, "[the President] is not the one who decides whether Board
members are abusing their offices or neglecting their duties. He can
neither ensure that the laws are faithfully executed, nor be held re'217
sponsible for a Board member's breach of faith.
Although the PCAOB Court's reliance on the Take Care Clause
does not suffer from the same internal inconsistencies as its discussion
of the executive power, the Court's analysis is not complete. Even if
the President's obligation of faithful execution carries whatever removal power is necessary to fulfill that obligation, the Court gives no
indication of the scope of the removal authority that the President's
faithful execution obligation would require. The Court's decision to
uphold the statutory scheme after eliminating the second for-causeremoval layer, despite the apparent limitations on presidential removal of SEC Commissioners, suggests a presumption that for-causeremoval restrictions in the case of an agency with the SEC's authority
do not interfere with the President's duties of faithful execution. If so,
then the PCAOB case stands for the proposition that it is the second
layer of removal protection that tips the balance. The necessary inquiry here, however, into precisely what removal power is needed to
fulfill the faithful execution duty, is notably absent from the Court's
analysis. 218
3. Structural Principles

Finally, the Court's invalidation of the structure of the PCAOB
relied not only on the scope of the executive power and the implications of the Take Care Clause, but also on structural separation of
powers principles, untethered to specific constitutional text. The
Court's opinion highlighted two such principles: concerns about presi-

Id. at 3154.
Similarly, the Court mentioned in passing the "traditional default rule" that "removal is
incident to the power of appointment." Id. at 3161. The Court did not connect that rule to its
invalidation of the PCAOB's tenure protection provision, but rather used the rule to presume
that, once the provision was invalidated, PCAOB members would be removable by the SEC.
See id. The logic behind the removal-follows-appointment theory, however, is similar to that
connecting the removal power to the obligation of faithful execution: those responsible for executing the law through their subordinates need to have the power to remove those whom they
appoint. See supra text accompanying note 107.
217
218
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dential accountability and fears of congressional aggrandizement at
219
the expense of the executive power.

First, the Court repeatedly invoked the idea of presidential accountability to the electorate, reasoning that the diffusion of power to
officials whom the President cannot directly supervise entails "a diffusion of accountability. ' 220 Quoting The Federalist No. 72, the Court
observed that "[t]he people do not vote for the 'Officers of the United
States,"' 221 but instead "look to the President to guide the 'assistants
or deputies ... subject to his superintendence."' 222 "Without a clear
and effective chain of command, the public cannot 'determine on
whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series
of pernicious measures ought really to fall.' ,,223 For this reason, the
Court suggested:
[T]he Framers sought to ensure that "those who are employed in the execution of the law will be in their proper
situation, and the chain of dependence be preserved; the
lowest officers, the middle grade, and the highest, will depend, as they ought, on the President, and the President on
'224

the community.
The Court returned to the theme of accountability in the opinion's
conclusion: without the removal power, "the President could not be

held fully accountable for discharging his own responsibilities; the
buck would stop somewhere else.

'225

Professor John Manning acknowledged the second of these two principles in critiquing
aspects of the PCAOB decision. See Manning, supra note 25, at 1971 n.167 (noting that the
PCAOB Court "reasoned from the broad purposes of the separation of powers to the specific
conclusion that the two-tiered removal restriction was impermissible"); id. at 1961 (describing
the phenomenon of the Court, even in formalist opinions, reasoning "from a general principle of
separation of powers to quite specific prohibitions against particular governmental practices").
220 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3155.
221 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2).
222 Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 72, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961)).
223 Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961)). This theme of course echoes a similar structural theme in the Court's federalism
opinions. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992) ("[W]here the Federal
Government directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of
public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain
insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision.").
224 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3155 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 499 (1789) (Joseph
Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Madison)); see also id. at 3154 (observing that a dual forcause tenure protection has no outer limit and could result in officials being protected by multiple layers of for-cause protection, rendering such officials "immune from Presidential oversight,
even as they exercised power in the people's name").
225 Id. at 3164.
219
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The Court's second structural separation of powers concern suggested that conferring executive authority upon officials over whom
the President lacks effective oversight disperses authority to Congress.
The Court described PCAOB's dual-layer tenure protection as a
"'blueprint for extensive expansion of the legislative power.' 2 26 Because Congress controls the salary and duties of executive officials
and the very existence of executive offices, "[o]nly Presidential oversight can counter [Congress's] influence. '227 Quoting James Madison
in The FederalistNo. 51, the Court observed that the Constitution not
only separates the legislative, executive, and judicial powers but also
gives each branch "'the necessary constitutional means, and personal
motives, to resist encroachments of the others. ' ' 22 8 The President's
"key means" of resisting congressional encroachment is "'the power
of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who execute the
laws.' "1229
Like its reliance on the vesting of the executive power in the
President and the obligation of faithful execution, the Court's reliance
on structural separation of powers principles cannot fully account for
its invalidation of the PCAOB's tenure protection provision. The
Court's focus on accountability implies the need for the sort of unitary
executive structure that many commentators believe the executive
power demands. 230 But the Court offered no account of why a second
layer of tenure protection threatens accountability when one layer
does not.23 1 Similarly, although the Court offered the PCAOB's insulation as an example of legislative encroachment, 232 it did not suggest
that any legislative regulation of the power to execute the law constitutes legislative encroachment. The Court thus left open the questions
of when the balance tips from permissible legislative regulation of the
power to execute the law to impermissible legislative encroachment
upon that power, and why two layers of insulation are excessive when
one layer is not.
226 Id. at 3156 (quoting Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 277 (1991)).
227
228

Id.
Id. at 3157 (quoting

THE FEDERALIST

No. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (James E. Cooke

ed., 1961)).
229 Id. (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 463 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep.
Madison)).
230 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
231 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Board, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3170-73
(2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that "the Court fails to show why two layers of 'for cause'
protection ... impose any more serious limitation upon the President'spowers than one layer").
232 See supra text accompanying notes 226-29.
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C. Beyond PCAOB
The PCAOB Court took pains to emphasize the narrowness of its
holding-in particular, that the holding carried no implications for the
civil service or for ALJs. 233 The Court did not similarly narrow the
constitutional sources of its decision. On the surface, the Court's use
of the Vesting Clause is significant as the first instance since Myers in
which the Court relied on the Vesting Clause to invalidate a removal
restriction. Yet on closer inspection, the Vesting Clause cannot account for the decision. The Take Care Clause may account for the
decision, but the Court's discussion of that provision is underdeveloped. The Court's reliance on structural principles likewise involves
significant gaps.
Taking the PCAOB case to its logical conclusion nevertheless
suggests that the Court sought to refocus assessment of removal disputes. Under the Court's approach, two questions are critical. First,
the case demonstrates the need for sustained attention to the question
of how the Take Care Clause bears upon analysis of presidential removal authority. If the executive power encompasses unlimited removal authority, then the PCAOB Court was right for the wrong
reasons. If instead PCAOB is properly read as requiring interpretation of the executive power in light of the duty of faithful execution,
then the scope of the power that duty implies-a topic that would
require a separate article-becomes critical. The obligation of faithful
execution has played a significant role in executive branch arguments
about the power to direct or remove executive officials, 234 but courts
and scholars have not fully explored the scope of any removal power
implied by the obligation of faithful execution. In this vein, it is important to ask whether an inquiry into what the obligation of faithful
execution requires is simply a variant of functional analysis. Taking
the Take Care Clause seriously, however, would require a more detailed textual and historical assessment than functional analysis typically entails. Justice Breyer's PCAOB dissent, for example, focused
principally on whether the dual for-cause removal provision would
233

See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3159-60.

e.g., CALABRESI & Yoo, supra note 63, at 142
(1846)); id. at 154 (citing United States v. Guthrie, 58 U.S.
(citing 7 Op. Att'y Gen. 453, 463 (1855)); id. at 182 (citing
Senate (Dec. 12, 1867), in 8 A COMPILATION OF MESSAGES
3781, 3790 (James D. Richardson ed., 1925)); id. at 324 (citing
Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958) (No. 52)).
234 See,

(citing 4 Op. Att'y Gen. 515, 516
284, 286-87 (1854)); id. at 154-55
Andrew Johnson, Message to the
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS

Brief of the United States at 15-16,

1412

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:1371

lead to congressional aggrandizement. 235 That narrow inquiry does not
capture the question whether a removal restriction prevents the President from ensuring faithful execution of the laws. The broader question of whether a removal restriction prevents the President from
accomplishing his constitutionally assigned functions-the question
posed by advocates of upholding the statutory scheme at issue in
PCAOB,236 and by the Morrison Court 237-is stated in such a generalized form that it requires no specific assessment of the powers that
the duty of faithful execution might entail. The PCAOB Court, of
course, fell short of conducting the specific assessment that its invocation of the Take Care Clause requires.
Second, if the linchpin of the PCAOB decision is that the twolayer removal provision is inconsistent with the duty of faithful execution, then the decision may have implications throughout the administrative structure, despite the Court's disclaimers. If we take the
Court's reliance on the obligation of faithful execution seriously, then
what those implications are again depends critically on the scope of
the removal power that the obligation of faithful execution entails.
Other scholars grappling with the implications of PCAOB have not
fully engaged this methodological point. Some have suggested that, at
its core, PCAOB is simply an application of functionalist reasoning. 238
As a descriptive matter, it is surely the case that the PCAOB Court
stopped far short of a complete analysis of the implications of the duty
of faithful execution. Yet dominant functional methodologies likely
would have pointed toward sustaining the dual for-cause removal provision, and there is little question that the Court sought to distance
itself from such methodologies. 239
Others have recognized a shifting methodological ground in
PCAOB but not discussed the role of the obligation of faithful execution in that shift. In a thoughtful article, for example, Professor Kevin
Stack argues that PCAOB's principle "is that the consistency of goodcause removal protections with separation of powers depends in part
on the combination of functions of the officials whose tenure those
235 See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S.Ct. at 3167 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[T]hat feature of the
statute-a feature that would aggrandize the power of Congress-is not present here.").
236 See, e.g., Brief for Constitutional and Administrative Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 9, Free Enter. Fund, 130 S.Ct. 3138 (No. 08-861).
237 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689-90 (1988).
238 See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, An Inductive Understanding of Separation of Powers, 63
ADMIN. L. REV. 467, 489 (characterizing PCAOB as "a particularized application of the principle that no branch may prevent another from fulfiling its constitutionally assigned function").
239 See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S.Ct. at 3146.
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provisions protect."2 40 That is, Professor Stack argues that the Court's
decision to invalidate the PCAOB's structure while carefully preserving the constitutionality of adjudicators operating within independent
agencies 241 must depend on the fact that PCAOB members exercise a
combination of functions.242 Reasoning backwards from the constitutionality of tenure protection for ALJs to the unconstitutionality of
tenure protection of the PCAOB suggests that the Court flipped the
constitutional baseline from one in which any adjudicative functions
entitle an officer to for-cause tenure protection to one in which the
exercise of any nonadjudicative functions preclude for-cause tenure
protection.2 43 Professor Stack's conclusion about the importance of

the combination of functions may be correct, but disentangling the
threads of PCAOB suggests that a different mode of analysis is appropriate. The challenge is not to identify a new constitutional baseline
by reasoning backwards from the constitutionality of tenure protection of ALJs to the unconstitutionality of the tenure protection of the
PCAOB, but to reason forward to determine the scope of the presidential removal power that the obligation of faithful execution entails.
PCAOB thus marks neither a full shift toward a Vesting
Clause-centered removal analysis nor a surrender to functionalism. It
instead highlights the need to explore the obligation of faithful execution to assess the scope of removal power that such an obligation
entails.

Stack, supra note 17, at 2392.
One could argue that, from the perspective of the PCAOB case, adjudicators operating
outside of independent agencies are indistinguishable from adjudicators operating within them,
because removal procedures are launched by the agency head, but also require a hearing before
another entity whose members have for-cause tenure: members of the Merit Systems Protection
Board. See 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2006); Free Enter. Fund, 130 S.Ct. at 3180-81 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (questioning the constitutional soundness of ALJ removal procedures following PCAOB).
242 Stack, supra note 17, at 2392 ("The [PCAOB] possesses rulemaking, enforcement, and
240
241

adjudicative functions. This combination of functions sets the Board's removal protections apart
from those of dedicated adjudicators within independent agencies whose removal protections
the Court sought to preserve, and furnishes the key ground of the [PCAOB] decision.").
243 Id. at 2392-93 (arguing that, taken to its logical extension, PCAOB "redraws the constitutional grounding of agency independence" by "preserv[ing] the constitutional foundation for
good-cause removal protections for dedicated adjudicators, but sweep[ing] aside that foundation
for officials with more than adjudicative functions").

